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[Abstract]  
This study examines the impact of social preferences on the individual incentives of 
participating in climate coalitions with laboratory experimental evidences. The 
theoretical result suggests that, when a player was inequality-neutral, a dominant 
strategy equilibrium could exist. However, individuals with social preference may 
lead a vacillated coalition formation. Joining or not joining depend on the player was 
critical or non-critical to an effective coalition respectively. The laboratory 
experimental result shows that players were inequality-averse and the coalition was 
usually larger than the equilibrium size but unstable. The inequality-averse attitudes 
have significantly positive impact on the incentives of participation. Particularly, 
when they are non-critical players, egalitarians are likely to give up the free riding 
benefit by joining a coalition. Our findings help to understand the climate coalition 
formation.  
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1. Introduction 
Since Barrett (1994), a large number of studies (such as Bahn et al. (2009), Barrett 
(2001), Bratberg, Tjøtta, and Ø ines (2005), and Eyckmans and Finus (2006)) have 
explored the formation of international environmental agreements (IEAs) on climate 
change. Most theoretical predictions on IEAs predicted a rather low number of 
signatories to a stable self-enforcing coalition (Grüning and Peters 2010). This is in 
sharp contrast to empirical evidence. Recent experimental studies (Burger and 
Kolstad 2010, Kosfeld, Okada, and Riedl 2006, McEvoy et al. 2014) have pointed out 
that actual coalition formations are usually larger than theoretical predictions. A 
growing number of studies have proposed that this challenge is due to the 
fundamental assumption of rational self-interest (Willinger and Ziegelmeyer 2001). 
The assumption of self-interest, has been widely employed in the majority of 
studies of IEAs, requires that rational agents pursue higher payoffs (Breton, Sbragia, 
and Zaccour 2010). Such assumption was not enough to explain individual decision 
makers' behaviours in a climate convention. Several studies (Lange 2006, Grüning 
and Peters 2010, Charness and Rabin 2002, Dannenberg et al. 2015) had suggested 
that the role of social preferences (also known as other-regarding preferences) should 
be considered to address this limitation.  
Several survey studies had also identified individuals’ social values and norms on 
preferences toward climate policies (Alló and Loureiro 2014, Domínguez Arcos, 
Labandeira Villot, and Loureiro García 2011, Hanemann, Labandeira, and Loureiro 
2011, Svenningsen and Thorsen 2017, Svenningsen 2017). To reach higher 
environmental standard for climate change mitigation, people with social values 
were willing to contribute more.  
As experimental economics provided some evidence for more complex human 
behaviour, extending the theory of IEAs to a broader class of preferences is clearly 
promising. Most of them, such as Kosfeld, Okada, and Riedl (2006) and Grüning and 
Peters (2010), suggested that countries’ preferences incorporate justice and fairness 
could promote abatement and enlarge the coalition size. On the other hand, Kolstad 
(2014) argued that such social preference reduced the equilibrium size of a coalition 
of agents formed to provide the public good.  
Although the influence of social preferences on coalition formation has be 
discussed, the influence on individual incentives for participating in a coalition has 
not yet been properly explored. A design with multiple equilibria, where agents have 
no dominant strategy, would limit the prediction of individuals’ decisions. Hence, 
this study answers two questions: Does the concern about payoffs of others affect to 
individuals’ decisions? How do such individual social preferences the coalition 
formation?  
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This study investigates the influence of individual social preferences in a climate 
coalition with experimental evidences. A theoretical model with a dominant strategy 
equilibrium was built to predict individual behaviours. If players were inequality-
neutral, based on their weakly dominant strategies, they could be either critical or 
non-critical. However, if players were inequality-averse, such equilibrium may not 
exist. There would be three possible outcomes: first, if players do not concern much 
about fairness, the outcome remains the same. Second, when critical players were 
inequality-averse, no stable coalition exists. Third, when non-critical players were 
inequality-averse, an effective coalition would be larger than the dominant strategy 
equilibrium. Such theoretical predictions were tested by a two-part laboratory 
experiment: the first part identifies individual inequality-averse attitudes by taking 
either a certain fair payoff or an all-or-nothing payoff. The second part was a 
membership game by asking subjects whether or not to join a coalition.  
There are two primary strengths in this study. First, individual decisions could be 
predictable in the model. This experiment design would provide a suitable 
environment to observe individual decisions when every player had a weakly 
dominant strategy. Second, in order to examine the impact of social preference on 
coalition formation, the theoretical prediction was compared with the actual 
experimental outcome. The design provides detailed observations on the process of 
individual decision and coalition formation.  
The outline of the study is as follows: In the next section, a benchmark model and 
an inequality-averse model were built. Section 3 introduces two experiments that 
were based on the theory built in Section 2. Then, Section 4 reports the experimental 
results and implications. The final section concludes.  
2. The Models 
This study builds a simple climate coalition game: players decide their 
membership. Signatories would do fully abate whilst nonsignatories would do fully 
pollute. The game considers two scenarios: the first scenario assumes that countries 
are self-interested and the second scenario assumes that countries have social 
preferences.  
Suppose   countries with different marginal benefits of the total abatement 
considered participation in a climate coalition, and then   countries joined while the 
rest did not. Each country has a heterogeneous marginal benefit,  , in the range of 0 
to 1 and an identical standardized unit cost of abatement.  
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Countries self-enforced to join an IEA and their payoffs depended on their 
membership status. In a profitable  -member coalition, the payoff of a non-signatory 
   (  ) is    , where    is its marginal benefit rate, and   is the total abatement from 
signatories. On the other hand, all of the signatories choose same abatement level in 
order to maximise the coalition payoff, then share the coalition payoff equally. The 
coalition payoff (  ) is the joint payoffs of   members (           ). The uniform 
abatement can be denoted as   . The coalition payoff is represented as    ∑   
 
    
∑ [(   )     ]
 
   .  
2.1 Benchmark model with self-interest preference 
In the scenario of self-interest, countries concern only their own payoffs. 
Nonsignatories choose pollute and signatories choose abate. Hence the payoffs of a 
nonsignatory   and a signatory   are presented respectively as  
              (Eq.1) 
   (  )  ∑   
 
    
    (Eq.2) 
In the membership game, countries were asked to simultaneously decide whether 
to participate in a coalition or not. Following d'Aspremont et al. (1983), when 
countries are self-interested, a stable coalition exists when both the internal and the 
external constraints are satisfied as follows: 
  ( 
 )    ( 
   )     (Eq.3) 
  ( 
 )    ( 
   )     (Eq.4)     
A country’s welfare function,  ( ), is equal to the country’s payoff which depends on 
the number of signatories ( ) and its membership status indicated by the subscript (  
means signatory;   means nonsignatory). The internal constraint (Eq.3) denotes that a 
signatory have no incentive to leave the   -member coalition where    is the stable 
number to maintain the coalition. The external constraint (Eq.4) indicates that a non-
signatory have no incentives to participate in a coalition as the (    ) th member. 
When both (Eq.3) and (Eq.4) are satisfied, a stable coalition would exist. Taking 
examples of experimental studies, such as Kosfeld, Okada, and Riedl (2006) and 
Burger and Kolstad (2010), there existed several stable coalition combinations. Due to 
no dominant strategy for countries, these studies failed to foresee individual 
decisions in the membership game. This study, in order to have better prediction on 
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individual decisions, focus on the cases of dominant strategy equilibrium. To reach 
such unique equilibrium, an additional condition should be satisfied:  
    ∑   
 
            (Eq.5) 
The condition categorises countries into two groups: critical and non-critical 
countries. Critical countries, with large marginal benefits, are essential to a profitable 
coalition. Therefore, the weakly dominant strategy of critical players is participating 
in a coalition. Non-critical countries, with small marginal benefits, can contribute the 
coalition but not necessary. The weakly dominant strategy of non-critical players is 
not to participate. The condition (Eq.5) implied that any critical country cannot be 
replaced by all of the non-critical countries. The condition ensures that the coalition 
is the only stable combination to be profitable. In other words, critical countries 
would participate in a coalition because they were necessary members and non-
critical countries would not participate because they could take advantage from free-
riding. While we acknowledge this is indeed a strong condition, in order to identify 
the individual incentives to participate in the coalition, this condition provided better 
observation of the individual decisions in the membership game.  
2.1 Inequality-averse preference in a coalition game 
We now turning to discuss the scenario of inequality-averse preferences. 
Following Fehr and Schmidt (1999), the magnitude of inequality-aversion indicates 
the level of dislike for unfair outcomes. With this concept, a country   (  [   ]) has a 
different welfare function  
       
  
   
∑    (        )   
  
   
∑    (        )    (Eq.6) 
where    is any other country except  . The first term is the payoff of country  . The 
second and third terms represent the average payoff gap from the other country    
with the disadvantage-loss parameter   and advantage-loss parameter   , 
respectively. Both of the parameters presented an inequality-averse magnitude of   
and were between 0 (inequality-neutral) and 1 (strongly inequality-averse).  
As previously mentioned, when countries were self-interested and the constraints 
of (Eq.3), (Eq.4), and (Eq.5) were satisfied, a stable   -member coalition existed. 
When inequality-aversion is taken into account, the coalition formation depends on 
the individual inequality-averse magnitudes. The coalition formation could become 
either a stable   -member coalition, unstable, or a stable coalition larger than   .  
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When all of the countries were inequality-neutral or weakly inequality-averse, a 
stable   -member coalition exists as (Eq.3), (Eq.4) and (Eq.5) stand. When any critical 
country was strongly inequality-averse, the country feels disadvantaged from the 
payoff gap between players. (Eq.3) would be violated by the absence of such country 
from the effective coalition. Nevertheless, the country has the incentive to participate 
if everyone yields nothing from a collapsed coalition. Therefore, the coalition 
formation became unstable. In the last circumstance, when any non-critical country 
was strongly inequality-averse, that country could participate to mitigate the payoff 
gap. Therefore, (Eq.4) would be violated and the coalition size is expanded and 
larger than   .  
Intuitively, there were a number of effects with inequality-aversion. First, 
egalitarianism reduces the individual welfare when the payoffs among the countries 
were not equal. A coalition could be enlarged by a non-critical egalitarian country, 
when it sought for smaller advantage loss. Second, the transfer mechanism where 
signatories equally shared the coalition payoff could minimise the payoff gap among 
the countries. However, except for a grand coalition, signatories always suffered the 
disadvantage loss from non-signatories. An expanding IEA tended to exacerbate the 
payoff gap between the signatories and the non-signatories. Egalitarian signatories 
could punish free-riders behaviour by turning down a profitable IEA. In other words, 
the effects of inequality-aversion could shape the stability and the formation of IEAs 
both internally and externally.  
3. Experiment Design and Procedure 
The experiment was conducted at the Centre for Experimental Economics (EXEC) 
laboratory at the University of York (UK) and programmed with z-Tree (Fischbacher 
2007). Fifty subjects were invited through the Online Recruitment System (ORSEE) 
(Greiner 2004). They were students from different countries and studied various 
disciplines. In order to understand the coalition formation, we mimicked the 
diversity in the real world where decision makers have different nationalities and 
multidisciplinary knowledge in this experiment.  
In order to ensure data quality, the subjects had to comprehend the rules of the 
game as much as possible. They were not allowed to exchange information and no 
conversation was allowed (except for asking the experimenter to clarify the questions) 
during the experiment. The experimenter introduced the rules and gave the 
participants time to read through the instructions thoroughly and to accomplish the 
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controlled questions. At the beginning of each part of the experiment, four control 
questions were asked in order to test the subjects’ understanding. A new part would 
only start if all of the subjects had answered all of the control questions correctly.  
A pre-experimental questionnaire was conducted in order to gather demographic 
information, including the subjects’ degree disciplines, age (the year they were born), 
ethnicity, political orientation, and their level of belief in a religion. Another two 
questions collected information about their self-evaluated preferences. The question 
regarding religion identified the subjects’ belief attitude on a scale ranging from 1 
(not religious at all) to 5 (extremely religious). The distribution of the level of 
religious attitude showed that most subjects considered themselves as mild belief. 
The last question aimed to indicate the subjects’ political preference (level one 
indicates left, level two indicates centre-left, level three indicates neutral, level four 
indicates centre-right, and level 5 indicates right). The distribution showed that most 
respondents were pro-left wingers.  
The experiment was comprised of two parts and its procedures were designed as 
follows. 
3.1 An inequality-averse preference test 
In this test, we aimed to examine the individuals’ attitudes towards inequality-
aversion. In order to extract information from a purified environment, the subjects 
were paired without knowing their partners or their partners’ decisions. Each subject 
had two roles: dictator and receiver. A receiver passively earned allowance from the 
dictator’s decision. A dictator, on the other hand, decided to share a £5 allowance 
with his/her receiver. There were two ways to share as shown in Table.3.1. Option 1 
shared the allowance equally, while option 2 allocated the allowance unjustly with 
an all-or-nothing allocation at a certain probability.    
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Table.1. Inequality-aversion Test 
Round Option 1 Option 2 
1 (£2.5, £2.5) for sure (£0, £5) with probability   0%;  (£5, £0) with probability 100% 
2 (£2.5, £2.5) for sure (£0, £5) with probability  10%;  (£5, £0) with probability  90% 
3 (£2.5, £2.5) for sure (£0, £5) with probability  20%;  (£5, £0) with probability  80% 
4 (£2.5, £2.5) for sure (£0, £5) with probability  30%;  (£5, £0) with probability  70% 
5 (£2.5, £2.5) for sure (£0, £5) with probability  40%;  (£5, £0) with probability  60% 
6 (£2.5, £2.5) for sure (£0, £5) with probability  50%;  (£5, £0) with probability  50% 
7 (£2.5, £2.5) for sure (£0, £5) with probability  60%;  (£5, £0) with probability  40% 
8 (£2.5, £2.5) for sure (£0, £5) with probability  70%;  (£5, £0) with probability  30% 
9 (£2.5, £2.5) for sure (£0, £5) with probability  80%;  (£5, £0) with probability  20% 
10 (£2.5, £2.5) for sure (£0, £5) with probability  90%;  (£5, £0) with probability  10% 
11 (£2.5, £2.5) for sure (£0, £5) with probability 100%;  (£5, £0) with probability   0% 
 
Option 1 was a fair allocation where the dictator faces no unfair loss. On the other 
hand, the all-or-nothing allocation in option 2 indicated two extreme cases. As 
described in (3.6), an inequality-averse agent considered both advantage-loss and 
disadvantage-loss. The range of the two extremities could be normalised. The range 
between two extreme unfair outcomes was normalised, so both the advantage- and 
disadvantage-losses could be merged as one inequality-averse indicator. Although a 
subject might suffer more from disadvantage than advantage, two reasons supported 
this technique. In practice, it is not easy to find a subject's preference without 
standardising the unit of the utility. In the literature, the experimental evidence 
showed that the disadvantage factor was not necessarily smaller than the advantage 
factor (Dannenberg et al. 2012, Yang, Onderstal, and Schram 2016). In round 1, the 
all-or-nothing allocation would be taken by a rational subject because the outcome 
was definitely better than that from option 1. By contrast, in the final round, the 
outcome for the fair allocation was better than that for the all-or-nothing allocation. 
For each subject with a consistent preference, there existed a point with a certain 
probability where the subject would switch from the all-or-nothing allocation to the 
fair allocation. The switch point indicated the individuals’ attitudes toward 
inequality-aversion.  
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When the subjects were inequality-neutral (or self-interested), then their welfares 
were the same to their monetary payoffs. In other words, they would switch when 
the expected outcome of all-or-nothing allocation was equal to that of fair allocation. 
When subjects were inequality-averse, their utilities were lower than their monetary 
payoffs. They were more likely to take an equal allocation in order to avoid 
extremely unfair consequences. Inequality acceptors, which never chose an equal 
allocation, could be possible, but they were uncommon in reality (as seen in the 
experimental results later). They could be observed in this experimental design. 
Therefore, we excluded those inequality acceptors from our analyses, similar to (Fehr 
and Schmidt 1999). 
It is important to bear in mind that this test could be characterised by strategic 
uncertainty due to the fact that a series of probabilities were involved. The subjects’ 
risk attitudes might have been involved in their decisions. In other words, it might 
have been difficult to distinguish the risk aversion and inequality aversion in this 
study. This issue might be avoided by employing two separate games in order to 
indicate the attitudes toward disadvantage- and advantage-aversion, such as those 
developed by Blanco, Engelmann, and Normann (2011) and Yang, Onderstal, and 
Schram (2012). However, this study was superior for two reasons. First, the two-
games created another bigger issue in that the measurement of two attitudes might 
have been biased. Second, there was a significant positive correlation between the 
inequality-aversion and risk-aversion (Carlsson, Daruvala, and Johansson‐Stenman 
2005, Kroll and Davidovitz 2003). It was unnecessary to distinguish the inequality-
aversion from the risk-aversion. 
3.2 Coalition game experiment 
This section mimic the international environmental negotiation by building a 
public goods game. The subjects were randomly assigned different roles in a group 
of five anonymous persons for the entire session. As described in Equations (1) and 
(2), the payoffs depended on the marginal benefit of the total abatement. In this 
study, we built eight treatments of various marginal benefits. Each group played four 
treatments for a session. Each treatment had 2 to 4 critical players whilst the rest 
played a role of non-critical. As explained earlier, based on the assumption of self-
interest, the unique-equilibrium design could help to identify individual decisions. 
As illustrated earlier, critical players were essential for a profitable coalition, while 
non-critical players had the incentive to free ride.  
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When the subjects had strong inequality-averse attitudes, then the critical players 
might have had the incentive to break the coalition internally. On the other hand, 
non-critical players might have given up the free-riding benefit by participating in a 
coalition. In this study, we assigned each subject a particular payoff table, which 
contained all of the possible payoffs with the corresponding coalition combinations. 
The payoff depended on the given parameters and the coalition formation. For any 
unprofitable coalition, all of the subjects in the group gained nothing in return. The 
possible payoffs for the subjects ranged from £0 up to £24. 
4. Experimental results 
The results for the inequality-averse test demonstrated that 31 out of the 50 subjects 
had clearly switched from the all-or-nothing allocation to the fair allocation. In 
particular, 2 subjects stuck with the fair allocation for the entire session. Their 
behaviours indicated their individual attitude toward inequality-aversion.  
Table.3. Number of Fair Allocation taken 
Round 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
Number for Fair 
Allocation Taken 
10 11 8 23 33 35 48 48 47 48 46 
 
Table 3 presents the number of fair allocations taken in each round. Initially, most 
of the subjects preferred the all-or-nothing allocation. Then, their decisions switched 
to the fair allocation. When the expected payoff of all-or-nothing became lower than 
that of the fair allocation, it is unsurprising that almost everyone took the fair 
allocation.   
Regarding the coalition formation in the membership game, profitable coalitions 
were formed in 387 out of 600 rounds, and the formation was usually larger than the 
self-interested equilibrium size. The actual coalition formation matched the self-
interested equilibrium in only 112 rounds. The coalitions were usually neither stable 
nor convergent to a particular coalition. With the same treatments, the coalition 
formation varied in different groups. For example, group 6 and group 8 both took 
treatments 5 to 8. Group 6 formed profitable coalitions in 47 rounds, but group 8 
achieved profitable coalitions in only 12 rounds.  
In this study, we predicted the individual incentives of participating in a coalition 
by employing the subjects’ inequality-averse attitudes and historical decisions in the 
membership game. On the other hand, benchmark self-interested predictions were 
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built by employing only the historical data in the membership game. The inequality-
averse predictions matched the actual decisions by 1,838 over 2,800 observations 
(65.6%). In the sample of 1,540 observations of critical subjects, the inequality-averse 
predictions matched the actual outcome for 77.2% of the observations. On the other 
hand, the inequality-averse predictions matched for 51.5% of the 1,260 observations. 
With individual inequality-averse predictions, the predicted coalition formation was 
shown as unstable, but it was usually larger than the actual formation.   
Table.5. Probit Estimations of Probability of Joining a Coalition 
Variable 
Probit 
MLE(1) 
Probit 
MLE(2) 
Probit 
MLE(3) 
Probit 
MLE(4) 
Probit 
MLE(5) 
Constant term 
8.98 
(12.36) 
0.52*** 
(0.16) 
-1.69 
(20.99) 
-0.49*** 
(0.15) 
16.57 
(18.65) 
Past Decision 
1.23*** 
(0.07) 
 
1.34*** 
(0.13) 
 
1.00*** 
(0.09) 
Inequality-
Averse 
Attitude 
0.04** 
(0.02) 
0.07*** 
(0.02) 
0.05** 
(0.02) 
0.05*** 
(0.02) 
0.03 
(0.09) 
Age 
-0.004 
(0.006) 
 
0.001 
(0.01) 
 
-0.008 
(0.009) 
Politic 
Attitude 
0.05 
(0.03) 
 
-0.13** 
(0.05) 
 
0.22*** 
(0.05) 
Religious 
Attitude 
-0.05** 
(0.02) 
 
0.03 
(0.03) 
 
-0.17*** 
(0.03) 
Critical player 
0.76*** 
(0.06) 
    
Marginal 
Benefit 
    
-6.37*** 
(1.11) 
Past Group 
Contribution 
-0.20* 
(0.12) 
 
-0.26 
(0.21) 
 
-0.34** 
(0.15) 
Total 
Observations 
2,520 1,500 1,400 1,200 1,120 
Observations 
of Joining 
1,692 1,279 1,185 555 507 
Log 
Likelihood 
-1219.83 -621.21 -513.39 -824.28 -771.30 
Note: Each cell contains coefficient and standard error in parenthesis. *, **, *** are significant at 10%, 
5%, and 1% respectively. 
 
Turning now to the factors that might have affected the individual decisions, the 
maximum likelihood estimation of the binary probit regressions (Probit MLE) were 
employed as shown in Table 3.5. The variables included the decision made during 
the previous round, the times of taking the fair allocation, the year the subjects were 
born, the political attitudes from left to right, the religious attitudes from atheist to 
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religious, the dummy variable of being critical players, the marginal benefit of the 
total contribution, and the group contribution in the previous round.  
Although the experimental design allowed for the existence of inequality 
acceptors, as predicted in the assumption of the theory, the degree of inequality-
aversion was unlikely to be negative. As mentioned in Footnote 7, five negative 
inequality-averse subjects were excluded from the sample observation. We examined 
45 subjects that had various attitudes toward inequality-aversion. The estimation of 
Probit MLE(1) covered all of the observations of the 2,520 individual decisions due to 
the observations in the first round being excluded. Among these observations, the 
subjects decided to join 1,692 times, while they did not decide to join 828 times. 
The inequality-averse attitudes, the dummy variable of being critical players, and 
the decision made in the previous round had significant positive effects on the 
decisions. This interesting result showed that the strongly inequality-averse subjects 
were more likely to participate in a coalition. It implied that subjects participated as 
the experimental design suggested, and that their decisions were consistent. Having 
said that, the group contribution to the participation was significantly negative due 
to the fact that the free-riding incentive was higher when the coalition was expanded. 
Another interesting result was that the subjects with a weaker religious belief were 
more likely to participate.  
This experimental design used a number of critical players to form a profitable 
coalition. Those critical players were essential in order to stabilise the coalition 
internally. Probit MLE(2) and Probit MLE(3) examined the observations of the critical 
players. Eighty five percent out of the 1,500 observations participated in a coalition as 
the design suggested. Their decisions were consistent with the past decisions. On the 
other hand, the experimental results showed that the coalition instability was caused 
by the subjects with low degrees of inequality-aversion rather than those with high 
degrees of inequality-aversion. As discussed in the theoretical section, egalitarians 
might break a coalition internally. In contrast, the experimental evidence showed that 
stronger inequality-aversion led subjects to stabilise the coalition internally.  
Interestingly, pro-left-wingers were more likely to participate. That being said, 
subjects had stronger incentives to form a profitable coalition when they were 
egalitarians or pro-left-wingers. Perhaps a low profit, but safe action appeared to be 
more favourable than a risky strategy of punishing and forcing free-riders to 
participate.  
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Having discussed the critical players, the non-critical players were assessed by 
the estimations of Probit MLE(4) and Probit MLE(5). Those non-critical subjects had 
the free-riding incentives. The results showed that such incentives were rejected for 
nearly half of the 1,200 observations. Again, the decisions were consistent with the 
historical data. Besides, egalitarian subjects were more likely to compromise and 
cooperate. Subjects with stronger attitudes towards inequality-aversion, such as 
taking the fair allocation for more than 6 rounds, were more likely to participate in a 
coalition.  
Apart from the inequality-averse attitudes, the estimation of Probit MLE(5) 
examined the factors. In contrast to the experimental evidence of the study by Burger 
and Kolstad (2010), the results of this study did not support their earlier finding that 
higher marginal benefits would significantly increase a coalition size and, 
consequently, the total contribution. The results suggest that the free-riding incentive 
for non-critical players could be mitigated by a lower marginal benefit. In other 
words, the marginal benefit to the total abatement had a significantly negative effect 
on the willingness of participation. It was intuitive that the non-critical players 
would not participate when the incentive was high.  
There is more policy implication from our results. Individual political and 
religious attitudes had significant effects on the willingness of participation. The pro-
left-wingers played strategically by cooperating when they were critical and not 
cooperating when they were non-critical. On the other hand, the atheists were more 
likely to cooperate when they were non-critical.   
5. Conclusions 
In this study, we examined the impacts of social preferences on the individual 
incentives of participating in climate coalitions by using a laboratory experiment. 
Theoretically, when countries are self-interested, stable coalitions exist if signatories 
have no incentive to leave and non-signatories have no incentive to join. In particular, 
we focused on a unique equilibrium which players had a weakly dominant strategy 
on membership decisions. Any critical player was essential to a profitable coalition 
and could not be replaced by all non-critical. Having introduced the benchmark 
model, we considered the individuals’ attitudes toward inequality-aversion in this 
study. When countries had a strong inequality-averse attitude, egalitarians could 
break the coalition internally or externally. Therefore, the coalition formation might 
enlarge, remain the same as the results of the benchmark, or become unstable.  
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A set of experiments was conducted in order to validate this hypothesis. The first 
test measured the individuals’ attitudes towards inequality-aversion. The second test 
was a public good game, which mimicked the international environmental 
convention. Subjects were given different payoff tables and asked whether or not 
they would join a coalition. Regarding the coalition formation in the membership 
game, the formation was usually larger than the self-interested equilibrium size. 
Under such conditions, the coalition formation was still difficult to predict, and even 
in this study, we employed the predictions with the individuals’ inequality-averse 
attitudes. The predicted formation was unstable and usually larger than the actual 
formation.   
Turning back to the research question, one may suggest that the inequality-averse 
attitudes had significant positive impacts on the incentives of participation. In 
particular, when the subjects were non-critical players, the egalitarians were likely to 
give up the free-riding benefit by joining a coalition. This result could explain why 
the coalition formation was usually larger than the Nash equilibrium.  
This study has multiple implications for public opinion elicitation and public 
policy. As mentioned earlier, the coalition formation could be influenced by 
individual social preferences. Our findings suggest that it is important to highlight 
not only the individual payoff but also the gap between players. Some significant 
factors could be illustrated intuitively. Most subjects were rational since they 
behaved consistently and pursued monetary incentives. In terms of the coalition 
formation, when more players were critical to the coalition and marginal benefits 
were higher both could lead to a higher free-riding incentive for non-critical players. 
Apart from that, other factors may not have been intuitive. According to their self-
examination in the questionnaire, the pro-left-wingers behaved strategically. They 
cooperated when they were critical players and non-cooperated when they were 
non-critical players. On the other hand, those atheists were more likely to be 
cooperative when they were non-critical players.  
In conclusion, individual inequality-averse attitudes could be the reason for large 
coalition formation. No matter whether they were critical players or not, a stronger 
attitude towards inequality-aversion led to more willingness to participate in a 
coalition. The results of this study also suggested that the individual motivation 
could be affected by their political and religious attitudes. The implications could 
advise policy makers on constructing a climate coalition for a better future.  
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